March 17th, 1846.

My dear parents,

In letter writing is one of the greatest of my limited means of enjoyment; so don't I often my vour patience I with a few

I regret you two some time ago to publish me if my

letters! Would it arrive in time — my reason for
delaying this was that, the honors of certain

Brice, who distinguished themselves by superior skill
might be brought forward more prominently than

those who performed simple acts of bravery — such as

are common enough in the army.

I must speak to the justice of some remarks
made concerning the character of my friend

Robert. But I am sure you hold a thorough
knowledge of his character derived not only from my

own observations, but from entire confidence even

on the most secret matters, that his indifference
to kindness is due to a different cause from

that to which you attribute it. I would also

tell you to consider this: that — although any large

act of kindness would, owing to his singular

temperament, be forgotten in a short time yet

the continued attention which has been shown

here by you and others of his friends, having

awakened his gratitude will never be forgotten.

Perhaps the bond I have just employed, expresses

my meaning very clearly. He has had too few

around him, from the strings of his refraining, to


love, that his feelings are really fallen asleep, and are slow to move at any time; yet not the least trace in the end. On this account, although Robert has liked many people he has loved very few, (nobody being anyone except), and to entirely have been separated from all relatives, so little sympathy have any of them exhibited for his dependant situation, that he may be considered, so far as they are concerned, entirely alone in the world, and I have known him to declare to me, that his affection for me exceeded that for any other, and it is to me that he has always confided his thoughts, plans, and feelings. While from this knowledge of his character I can assure, of his grateful attachment to you all, I regard your kindness to him, my dear parents, as a most delicate and gratifying instance of your affection to me. I wrote a letter to Robert a few days since, but he is probably in his way here already, if Dr. Rushall has accepted the offer. It left London for New York about the century, has, since the battle gone crazy, and in consequence left the country. It is supposed that he will resign, probably not to take effect till the end of the year. Dispatches arrived a week since from Washington, in the greatest haste. The instructions of the President are that, the Army must go to Tampa, to which end General, having been whether to proceed by land or to embark, it is said that
he is resolved upon the former!!! It has been a constant source of vexation to me, that I am obliged to be so guarded in the expression of my opinions on Military Operations, lest my speculations could have any interest for you, but they might, perhaps, at some future day, afford a topic for fireside conversation. You will remember that in the first letter (I think) written by me after arriving opposite Matamoras, I recorded my strong protest against the operations with the Red Grauda as a base: I respecting the Castle of St. Juan de Ulloa to be impregnable to the attack of our Navy, I thought Tampico would probably be the best Leaping town, and would answer very well as a base. From there to the City of Mexico is exactly 300 miles. I do not know what kind of road there is from Tampico to Mexico, but it ought to be passable, if it is not, perhaps there are other Leaping e.g. Alvarado. If the Army could land there, a road runs directly into the main road from Vera Cruz to Mexico, along which an army might advance, if there is enough to leave a large detachment to watch the garrison of St. Juan de Ulloa for their service a regiment of Regulars with 300 Volunteers would be enough, a large army of 15 to 18000 men, march on the Capital. These numbers would be readily raised by uniting the Angora and Gidd Wood, now engaged in a ridiculous militia top.
Indeed the whole war has been carried on, not a failure of exploded political principles at the bottom 1843. That the country which we mean to retain at the end of the war, must be occupied during the war, just as if Italian territories had never been gained by war on the Danube, or German States by battles on the Po.

The distance from Monterey to Sappington, by St. Louis, must be 850 miles. It is 600 to Mexico, according to the map you lent me (which is very useful indeed for these purposes on a large scale, though inaccurate in the details, e.g., Camargo is on the wrong side the 36th parallel there should be the Alamos). If at St. Louis we are 150 from Sappington, double that from the capital, what there is to be done? If we can move beyond St. Louis, let it be by all means direct to Mexico. If we are to establish a seaport base, why much move 500 miles, when so many places, especially dry regions, expose them to the attacks of guerrillas, and oblige them to bear the horrors of battle when all this could be avoided any early? Do we expect in this way to preserve our present conquests? It is folly to desire it and it would be cruel to leave small garrisons exposed to the horrors of a revolt and would endanger the ultimate success we have made. Now, by a secret agreement, the future movements of the Navy, and after satisfactory information had been obtained, I was to make plans for our next steps.

If at this moment I had to direct the future movements of the Navy, I would have made the best use of our position.
and reached extremely our rear all my troops at
the Brazos sail for Tampico (of the roads from it was
reported practicable) and having fortified it established
there my depot, would march on Mexico. Such are
my day dreams, and, whatever may be the success
of the plans now entertained, I shall always attribute
it solely to the superiority of our troops on the
battle field. — As I am so much in the
harmonia of the egotistical chattering this morning just
for me, to let off a little more of my superabundant
litfe — the whole success of the battle at
Montery was due, in my opinion, to Gen. W. x
yet his command is accountable for only 50 kilo-
rounded out of 561 — what a triumph for Oregon!!!

The road as I told you approaches Monterey, running in
a South Westerly direction and entering it in the Salt Raka.
The right side of the town are commanded by heights
which W. st. immediately attacks and occupies, and
here the battle should have ended. Why did it not?
Why were so many men needlessly slaughtered on the
left of the town? In the first place the large gun,
excepting two guns, were mortared, was left behind !!!!!!!

As to 9:05, let it remain —

And now my dear parents. That I have done with this,
I feel decidedly better, and as I am conscious
that I have, by speaking oracularly, given well-
 founded suspicion of sanity, let me beg you to
be indulgent, and to believe one that I have not
written from a desire to make a display of my
new literary military talent, but because this
being a subject of such alarming interest to me, I cannot talk on it occasionally. To you, who will judge my ideas more impartially than others might feel disposed to.

Dr. Temple has gone up to Montevideo and his influence encouraged me to expect an order to join the forces there. If I join any regiment, I should like much to again with the 1st. Sept.

My health continues good, and I hope all is well with you.

Gentleman,

Gentleman,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Date: 18-16]